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Abstract. Logging systems are an essential component of security systems
and their security has been widely studied. Recently (2017) it was shown
that existing secure logging protocols are vulnerable to crash attack in which
the adversary modifies the log file and then crashes the system to make it
indistinguishable from a normal system crash. The attacker was assumed to
be non-adaptive and not be able to see the file content before modifying and
crashing it (which will be immediately after modifying the file). The authors
also proposed a system called SLiC that protects against this attacker. In
this paper, we consider an (insider) adaptive adversary who can see the file
content as new log operations are performed. This is a powerful adversary
who can attempt to rewind the system to a past state. We formalize security
against this adversary and introduce a scheme with provable security. We show
that security against this attacker requires some (small) protected memory
that can become accessible to the attacker after the system compromise. We
show that existing secure logging schemes are insecure in this setting, even
if the system provides some protected memory as above. We propose a novel
mechanism that, in its basic form, uses a pair of keys that evolve at different
rates, and employ this mechanism in an existing logging scheme that has
forward integrity to obtain a system with provable security against adaptive
(and hence non-adaptive) crash attack. We implemented our scheme on a
desktop computer and a Raspberry Pi, and showed in addition to higher
security, a significant efficiency gain over SLiC.
Keywords: Secure logging; crash attack; adaptive attack; forward security
1 Introduction
Computer systems use logging function to store and keep track of important events
in the system. Log files are used for a variety of purposes including trouble shooting,
intrusion detection and forensics [1,7,9]. In many cases, adversaries want to stay
covert and be able to modify the log files without being detected. Thus, integrity of
log data is essential, and protecting the log files against tampering and modification
has been an active area of research. The simplest form of protection is to store each
log entry with the corresponding message authentication code (MAC), and with a key
that is unique to the entry to ensure the entries cannot be permuted [3]. One cannot
expect any protection after the time of system compromise: the attacker is assumed
to have access to the system, algorithms, and the keys at the compromise time (full
state of the system) and can add any log that they desire afterwards. Thus the goal of
? A short version of this paper has been accepted to the 12th international symposium on
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protection is maintaining integrity of the past logs. This is called forward security or
forward integrity [3] and is achieved by evolving forward (using a one-way function)
the key that is used for generating integrity information of log entries. In [13], authors
used forward integrity based one MAC and hash chains and proposed a secure audit
log for a local untrusted logging device that has infrequent communication with the
verifier. LogCrypt [8] made some improvement to [13] such as the ability to use public
key cryptography as well as aggregating multiple log entries to reduce latency and
computational load. Forward integrity, however, does not protect against truncating
of the log file: the adversary can remove entries at the end without being detected.
This attack can be protected against by including an aggregate MAC (signature) to
the file, which is proposed in [10,11] through the notion of forward-secure sequential
aggregate authentication. The authentication data (tag) per log entry is sequentially
aggregated and the individual tag is removed.
When a system crash happens, the data that are stored in caches (temporary
memories) will be erased or become unreliable. Caches may include new log entries
and updates to the stored log entries, so a crash would result in the loss of new entries,
that have not been stored yet, and inconsistency of existing ones. This provides a
window of opportunity for attackers to modify the log file and remain undetected
by crashing the system. Crash attack was introduced and formalized by Blass and
Noubir [6]. They showed that all existing secure log systems were vulnerable to this
attack. Blass and Noubir formalized the security notion of crash integrity using a
game between the adversary and a challenger, and proposed a system, SLiC, that
provides protection in this model. SLiC encrypts and permutes the log entries so that
they cannot be known to a non-adaptive adversary who gets only one time read and
tampering access to the system (please see Appendix A for details).
Our work: We consider a secure logging system that uses an initial key (that is
shared with the verifier) to generate authenticated log entries that are stored in the
log file. We assume an (insider) adaptive crash adversary who can adaptively choose
the messages that will be logged and can see the log file after each logging operation.
The goal of the adversary is to remove and/or tamper with the logged elements. We
show that without other assumptions and by the verifier only using their secret key,
it is impossible to provide security against adaptive crash attack. We thus assume the
system stores (and evolves) its keys in a small protected memory, that will become
accessible to the adversary after the system is compromised. Such a memory can be
implemented using trusted hardware modules whose content will not be observable
during the normal operation of the system, but can become accessible if the system
crashes. We formalize security and show that SLiC is insecure in this model and an
adversary who can see the intermediate states of the log file can successfully rewind
the system to a previous state.
Adaptive crash resistance: We introduce a double evolving key mechanism which,
in the nutshell, uses two keys, one evolving with each log event and one evolving at
random intervals, that reduces the success chance of crash attack even if the adver-
sary is adaptive. The keys become available after the system compromise but the
random interval evolution limits the success probability of the adversary to success-
fully rewind the system to a previous state. We analyze this system in our proposed
model and prove its security against an adaptive attacker. This mechanism can be
extended to multiple independent keys evolving at different rates to enhance the se-
curity guarantee of the system. We implemented double evolving key mechanism on
a windows PC and Raspberry PI and compared the results with those reported for
SLiC [6], showing significantly improved time-efficiency.
Discussion: The double evolving key mechanism keeps the logged events in plain-
text and provides an elegant and very efficient solution against non-adaptive crash
attack. SLiC, the only secure logging system with security against (non-adaptive)
crash attack, provides security by encrypting and permuting elements of the log file.
This makes access to logged data extremely inefficient: one needs to reverse the en-
cryption and permutation to access the required element. For functionalities such as
searching for a pattern or keyword, this means recovering the whole log file which is
impractical. The comparison of the two systems is further discussed in Section 5.
Organization: Section 2 gives the background; Section 3, describes adaptive crash
model and its relation to non-adaptive case. Section 4 proposes the double evolving
key mechanism and Section 5 is on the security and complexity analysis of our scheme.
Section 6 explains the implementation, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
We use the system model of Blass et al. [6] which models many systems that are used
in practice, and focus on the settings where the verifier is mostly offline and checks
the log file once in a while (infrequently).
An event mi is a bit string that is stored in the log file together with an authen-
tication tag hi, such as hi = HMACki(mi). The key ki is for authentication of the
ith log entry and is generated from an initial seed. The key ki is evolved to ki+1 for
(i+ 1)th entry and ki is removed. Using a different key for each element protects not
only against reordering, but also ensures that if the key is leaked, past keys cannot
be obtained and past entries cannot be changed. A common way of evolving a key
is by using a pseudorandom function family PRFk(.) indexed by a set of keys [3],
that is, ki+1 = PRFki(χ), where χ is a constant. The security guarantee of a PRF
family, informally, stated as follows: a function that is chosen randomly from the
PRF family cannot be distinguished from a random oracle (a function whose outputs
are chosen at random), using an efficient algorithm, with significant advantage. To
protect against truncation attack where the adversary removes the last t elements of
the log file, one can add an aggregate hash hi+1 = HMACki+1(mi+1, hi) and delete
hi, or use an aggregate signature where signatures generated by a single signer are se-
quentially combined. If verification of aggregate signature is successful, all the single
signatures are valid; otherwise, at least one single signature is invalid.
In all these schemes, the event sequence order in the log file remains the same
as the original event sequence, and the verification requires only an original seed
from which the key for the rest of the system can be reconstructed. Crash attack
uses this property and the fact that a crash will remove all the new events and a
number of the stored events that must be updated, so it makes parts of the log file,
including the stored keys, inconsistent. This possibility in a crash can be exploited
by the adversary to launch a successful truncation attack. Blass et al. system, called
SLiC [6], protects against crash attack by encrypting each stored log entry (so makes
them indistinguishable from random), and uses a randomized mapping that permutes
the order of the log entries on the log file using a pseudorandom number generator
(PRG). Informally, a PRG uses a seed to generate a sequence of numbers that is
indistinguishable from a random sequence. Using the PRG, the order of storing events
in the log file will appear “random” to the adversary who does not know the PRG
seed and so truncation attack is prevented. This protection however will not work
against an adaptive attacker who will be able to see the result of storing a new event,
and by comparing the new re-ordered log file with the previous one learn the places
that can be tampered with (See section 3.3 for details of the attack).
As outlined above, storing a new event and its authentication data will result in
the update of some existing entries in the log file. In particular, to update a stored
value x to x′, the following steps will happen: (i) read x and compute x′, (ii) store
x′, and (iii) delete x. However the last two steps may be re-ordered by the operating
system, so when a crash happens, the state of the update will become unknown: that
is x has been deleted and x′ has not been written yet. This reordering would result
in inconsistency during the log verification. When a crash happens, the data in the
cache becomes unreliable and the verification of the log file requires not only the
initial seed, but also an estimate of the part of the log file that is verifiable. Similar
situation can happen in the update of keys, resulting in both ki−1 and ki to become
unavailable for the system recovery. The goal of the verifier is to recover the largest
verifiable log sequence from the crashed system.
3 System and adversary model
We first give an overview of our system and the adversary model. There are three
entities: 1) a logging device L, 2) a verifier V, and 3) an adversary A.
Logging device L, stores the event sequence and current keys using the following
types of storages: (i) LStore is a disk (long term storage) that stores log events. This
disk can be read by the attacker when the system is compromised. (ii) Log cache is a
temporary memory that is used for the update of the LStore. (iii) KStore is the key
disk that is used to store current keys of the system. This is a non-volatile memory
that will become available to the adversary when the system crashes. KStore uses a
protected cache for its update.
The logging device receives a sequence of events m1,m2 . . .mi, i ∈ N+, where i
is the order of appearance of the event mi in the sequence, and N
+ is the set of
positive integers. The state of the logging device after mi is logged, is specified by
Σi = [Σ
K
i , Σ
L
i , Cachei], where Σ
L
i , Σ
K
i and Cachei = {cacheLi , cacheKi } are the
states of the LStore, the KStore and their caches, respectively, after mi is logged.
The log operation Log(Σi−1,mi) takes the state Σi−1, and the log event mi,
uses the cache as a temporary storage, and updates LStore for the storage of the
(processed) log event. This operation uses KStore cache to update the keys in the
KStore. We assume this cache only holds the required data for updating ki−1 to ki
that is used in Log(Σi−1,mi). This assumption is used to estimate the amount of
key information that will be unreliable after a crash. We also assume that KStore
has enough size to hold the current key ki.
The Log(Σi−1,mi) operation, (i) generates a set of write operations
{o(mu) · · · o(mv)}, which we denote with OLog(Σi−1,mi), on the LStore (i.e. ΣLi and
its associated cache are updated), and (ii) updates KStore (i.e. ΣKi and its cache are
updated). A disk write operation o(mi) (we call it a log file entry) writes to the disk
mi together with its authentication data. The initial states of LStore and KStore are
denoted by ΣK0 and Σ
L
0 , respectively. Σ
L
0 contains an initial event that is used to
detect complete deletion of the disk. ΣK0 contains the initial keys of the system.
As log events are processed, the states of the two storage systems will be updated
in concert: after n log operations, the length of ΣL0 is n, and the length of Σ
K
0 is
unchanged, but the content has been updated to the new values. The initial state of
the system Σ0 will be securely stored and later used for verification.
Adversary, A, (i) adaptively generates events that will be processed by the
Log(·, ·) operation of L; A can see LStore and its cache after each Log(·, ·) operation;
(ii) compromises L and accesses KStore and its cache, and modifies the state of L,
and finally crashes the system. The goal of the crash adversary is to modify the
LStore and KStore such that a verifier who uses the initial state of the system, and
the crashed state cannot detect the attack. In Section 3.3, we define our security
game using this model.
Fig. 1: (a) Non-adaptive adversary, (b) Adaptive adversary. The shadowed parts are in-
visible to adversary before compromising the system.
Figure 1 shows the differences between our adversarial model and that of Blass
et al. [6]. In Figure 1.(a) Log(·, ·) operation generates disk writes in the cache first,
which are then written to the log file. The system current key resides in the system
cache also. The adversary can use the Log(·, ·) operation on the message sequence
of their choice but cannot see the intermediate results of logging until the system is
compromised. It is easy to see that in this model it is impossible to provide security
if the adversary is given access to the system after each Log(·, ·) operation: the
adversary observes the current key and can simply use it to generate any arbitrary
log event and later write it in the log file without being detected. Figure 1.(b) shows
our model.
We will not consider the case that the adversary adds new entries to LStore: this
can always be done undetectably because the adversary knows the content of the
KStore after the compromise. We however require that the log events that have been
stored “before the time of the compromise (crash)”, remain untouched.
Verifier, V, uses Recover(·, ·) algorithm that takes the current state of the logging
system, and the initial state Σ0, and outputs either the list of consistently stored
events, or ⊥ which indicates untrusted log.
3.1 Logging Protocols
A logging protocol Π consists of three algorithms:
1. Gen(1λ): Gen takes a security parameter λ and outputs Σ0, which is L’s initial
state, Σ0 = [Σ
L
0 , Σ
K
0 , Cache0 = ∅], and will be stored securely for future use by the
verifier V. The initial state includes: (i) ΣL0 , that is, the initial state of the log file
and it is initialized securely to protect against complete removal of the log file, (ii)
ΣK0 , that stores the initial seed keys, and (iii) Cache0 = {cacheL0 , cacheK0 }, which
are assumed to be initially empty.
2. Log(Σi−1,mi): Let Σi−1 = [ΣKi−1, Σ
L
i−1, Cache] be the current state after i − 1
sequence of events are logged. For an event mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, and the current state Σi−1,
the operation Log(·, ·) outputs, either a new state Σi, or a special state Σcri , called a
crashed state. A non-crashed state is a valid state that is the result of using Log(·, ·)
consecutively on a sequence of log events. If Log(·, ·) outputs a crashed state, the
device L has been crashed and needs to be initialized.
3. Recover(Σ,Σ0): Receives an initial state Σ0 and a (possibly crashed) state Σ,
and verifies if it is an untampered state that has resulted from Σ0 through con-
secutive invocation of Log(·, ·). Recover(Σ,Σ0) reconstructs the longest sequence of
events in the LStore that pass the system integrity checks, or outputs ⊥ which indi-
cates an untrusted log. If Σ had been obtained from Σ0 by consecutive applications
of n Log(·, ·), then Recover(Σ,Σ0) will output the n logged events. Otherwise the
set, R, of recovered events consists of n′ < n pairs R = {(ρ1,m′1), ..., (ρn′ ,m′n′)}.
If one of m′j 6= mρj , the adversary has been able to successfully modify a log en-
try. For example the correct pair with ρi = 4 will have m
′
i = m4. We use n and
n′ to denote the length of the logged sequence before crash, and the highest in-
dex of the log file seen by Recover(·, ·). The input state Σ to Recover(·, ·) can be:
(i) a valid state of the form (Log(Log(...Log(Σ0,m1)...),mn), so Recover(·, ·) out-
puts, {(1,m1), ..., (n,mn)}; (ii) a state which is the result of a normal crash, so
Recover(·, ·) outputs,(ρ1,m′1), · · · (ρn′ ,m′n′) where n′ < n; (iii) a state which is nei-
ther of the above, so Recover(·, ·) outputs ⊥, and a modified (forged) or missing
event is detected.
Efficiency: To support high frequency logging and resource constrained hard-
ware, Log(., .) is required to be an efficient algorithm.
3.2 Cache
We use (a parameter) cache size cs, first introduced in [6], to estimate the effect
of crash when recovering the log file. cs is the maximum number of log events that
will be lost during a normal crash. This number can be estimated for a particular
implementation (e.g., taking into account the caches of operating system, file system,
hard disk, ...), and allows us to estimate the maximum length of unreliable log events.
Logging the eventmi will generate a set of disk write operations,OLog(Σi−1,mi) =
{o(mu), ..., o(mv)}, that will add a new entry to the LStore and may update a num-
ber of other entries. The log operation Log(Σi−1,mi) will also update kj−1 to kj ,
for all o(mj) ∈ OLog(Σi−1,mi). If L crashes before Log(Σi−1,mi) completes, all
o(mj) ∈ OLog( Σi−1,mi) will be lost. This is because all these operations are in
cache. For simplicity, we assume the KStore stores the key kj which is used in con-
structing o(mj) only. To perform Log(Σi−1,mi), each o(mj) ∈ OLog( Σi−1,mi) will
be processed once at a time (The argument can be extended to the case that KStore
is larger). If crash happens, the kj that is being updated will also become unreliable.
The notion of expendable set, first introduced in [6], captures the LStore entries that
are considered unreliable when a crash happens.
Definition 1 (Expendable set (ExpSet)). Let Σn be a valid state comprising
events {m1, ...,mn}, and Cachen = ∅. Let Cachen′ be the content of cache after L
adds events (mn+1, ...,mn′) using the Log(·, ·) operation. An event mi is expendable
in state Σn′ , iff (o(mi) ∈ {OLog(Σn,mn+1) ∪ · · · ∪ OLog(Σn′−1,mn′)}) ∧ (o(mi) ∈
Cachen′). The set of all expendable log entries in Σn′ is denoted by ExpSet.
The definition identifies o(mi)s that are in the expendable set assuming the first
and the last state of the cache are known. In practice however, the verifier receives
a log file of size n′ (events) and without knowing the final state of the system must
decide on the length of the file that has reliable data. If the cache can hold cs events,
then we consider 2cs events (the interval [n− cs+ 1, n+ cs]) as expendable set. This
is the set of events who could have resided in the cache when the crash occured. Note
that logging an event may generate more that one disk write operation that could
be update of the earlier entries in the log file. The following proposition summarizes
the discussion above.
Proposition 1. (Determining expendable set). Let Σn′ be the state of the system
after logging m1, · · · ,mn′ . An event mi is expendable in a state Σn′ , where n′ is the
highest index of a log entry in the LStore1, if o(mi) ∈ {OLog(Σn′−cs,mn′−cs+1) ∪ · · ·∪
OLog(Σn′+cs−1,mn′+cs)} and possibly o(mi) ∈ Cachen′ . The set of all expendable
log entries in the recovered state Σn′ is ExpSet = {mi : mi is expendable in Σn′}.
Proof. We assume cache will include up to cs log events. These events, (i) may all be
events after n′; that is, from Log(Σn′ ,mn′+1) ∪ · · · ∪ Log(Σn′+cs−1,mn′+cs), events
[(n′+ 1, o(mn′+1)), . . . , (n′+ cs, o(mn′+cs))] may have been lost, and other disk write
events may not have been completed, or (ii) the writing is incomplete, so the logging
of up to cs events before n′ will have incomplete disk write and Log(Σn′−cs,mn′−cs+1)
∪ · · · ∪ Log(Σn′−1,mn′), have been damaged, or (iii) a random set of cs events in
Log(Σn′−cs,mn′−cs+1) ∪ · · · ∪ Log(Σn′+cs−1, mn′+cs), have been lost. Therefore, all
the log events in the range [n′ − cs + 1, n′ + cs] is considered to be expendable set.
Thus the size of expendable set on the LStore is 2cs events.
3.3 Security Definition
The effect of crash on the system in general depends on the hardware, and is ab-
stracted by the cache size parameter cs. Our new security definition for adaptive crash
attack is given in Algorithm 1. We define a security game between the challenger and
an adversary A that has access to the following oracles.
Gen oracle: GENQ() allows the adversary A to initialize a log on L. C runs
Gen(1λ) and returns the initial state of LStore Σ′L0 and its associated cache cache
′L
0 .
The state Σ′0 is stored in the set Q that records the log queries made by the adversary.
Log oracle: LOGΣ,Q(), is a stateful function, which allows the adversary A to
adaptively log events on L: the adversary adaptively chooses a message m to be
logged, C runs Log(·, ·) using the current state Σ of the system, and returns, Σ′L
(state of the LStore) and the cache′L (state of the cache) to A. The state Σ′ is stored
in the set Q that records the log queries made by the adversary (This is later used
to detect rewind attack).
1 Note that this LStore may be the result of normal logging operation, or after a crash.
Recover oracle: RECΣ(), is a stateful function, that can be called in any state
by A. To respond, C runs Recover(Σ,Σ0) and returns the recovered set R which can
be either ⊥ or {(ρ1,m′1), · · · , (ρn′ ,m′n′)}.
Crash oracle: CRASHΣ(), is a stateful function, that can be called by A on
any state Σ and allows A to learn the effect of crash on the system by accessing the
complete state Σ of the system including the KStore. CRASHΣ() returns Σ
cr as the
state of the logging device L.
In Algorithm 1, the first stage is for adversary to learn. A gets oracle access
to all the functions mentioned above and chooses n messages to log. Challenger C,
generates the initial keys and initializes the KStore, LStore, and the Cache. At
this stage, adversary has oracle access to GENQ(), LOGΣ,Q() and CRASHΣ(). A
adaptively issues n log queries, m1 . . .mn, to LOGΣ,Q() oracle. The oracle executes
Log(Σ,m) for each message and returns the LStore and cache′L of the resulting
state Σ′ to adversary. Σ′ is stored in the queried set Q. After n calls to Log(·, ·), A
calls CRASHΣ(), gets full access to the LStore, KStore and Cache, which all will
be tampered as desired, and then crashes the system. Adversary outputs a sequence
of ` positions αi, where αi ∈ [1, n], none of which correspond to the index of an
element in the expendable set, assuming n is the highest index in LStore seen by
the verifier. The algorithm Recover(·, ·) outputs a sequence of n′ < n index-event
pairs {(ρi,m′i)}. Intuitively, the adversary wins if, (i) one of their outputted indexes
appear in R with a value different from the original logged sequence (i.e. successfully
changed by the adversary), (ii) one of the outputted indexes does not appear in R
(that is successfully deleted by the adversary), or (ii) the recovered list R matches
the LStore of one of the queried states.
Definition 2 (Crash Integrity).A logging protocol Π = (Gen,Log,Recover) pro-
vides f(λ)-crash integrity against adaptive adversary A, iff for all PPT 2 adversaries
there exist a negligible function f(·) such that Pr[ExpAdapCrA,Π (1λ, cs)] ≤ f(λ).
3.4 Impossibility result
Existing secure log schemes, i.e. [3,13,8,11], consider an ordered log where a new log
entry is appended to the end of LStore. These schemes use key evolution but do not
use secure hardware or platforms to store the latest secret key that captures the state
of the log file. Nor do they rely on a trusted third party to safeguard this information.
These protocols are vulnerable to non-adaptive crash attack [6] because adversary
knows the order of log entries, can truncate the log file and delete the keys, leaving
the system in a stateless situation, which makes it impossible to distinguish a crash
attack from a normal crash. SLiC, is the only known crash tolerant scheme [6] which
masks the order of elements in the log file by encrypting them and applying a random
permutation on the location of log entries in the LStore. However, it cannot protect
against rewinding in an adaptive adversarial model. All existing schemes, including
SLiC, are vulnerable to adaptive crash attack even considering a protected KStore
according to our model. This is because the KStore can be undetectably removed
or modified when the system is compromised and this will again put the logging
system in a state that is indistinguishable from a normal crash. In another words,
a logging system that cannot reliably protect its state information during logging
2 Probabilistic Polynomial Time
Algorithm 1 ExpAdapCrA,Π (1
λ, cs) :
1: (m1,m2, . . . ,mn)← A(1λ, GENQ(), LOGΣ,Q(), RECΣ(), CRASHΣ())
2: Σ0 ← Gen(1λ)
//Σ0 = [Σ
K
0 , Σ
L
0 , Cache0]
3: (Σcr, α1, . . . , α`)← AGENQ(),LOGΣ,Q(),CRASHΣ()(ΣL0 ,m1, . . . ,mn)
//Σcr = [Σcr,L, Σcr,K , Cachecr], αi ∈ [1, n]
4: R ← Recover(Σcr, Σ0)
//R =⊥ or R = (ρ1,m′1), . . . , (ρn′ ,m′n′ )
5: if R =⊥ then
6: Output ⊥
7: else if
[∃(αi, ρj) : (αi = ρj) ∧ (mαi 6= m′j)] ∨ //Modify
[∃αi /∈ ExpSet : ρj 6= αi, ∀j = 1, . . . , n′] ∨ //Delete
[R = Σ′L, Σ′ ∈ Q] //Rewind
8: Output Success then
9: end
//GEN runs Gen(·), returns Σ0
GENQ() :
Σ′0 ← Gen(1λ)
Q← Q ∪Σ′0
Return (Σ′L0 , cache
′L
0 )
//LOG runs Log(·, ·) on m,
returns the state of LStore and Cache
LOGΣ,Q(m) :
Σ′ ← Log(Σ,m)
//Σ′ = [Σ′L, Σ′K , Cache′]
Q← Q ∪Σ′
Return (Σ′L, cache′L)
//REC runs Recover(·, ·), returns R
RECΣ() :
R ← Recover(Σ,Σ0)
Return R
//CRASH crashes the L, returns Σcr
CRASHΣ() :
Return (Σcr)
operation, and assuming an adaptive adversary who can see the LStore, is subjective
to rewinding.
We note that ExpAdapCrA,Π () is stronger than Exp
CrInt
A,Π,Crash() game [6]. This can be
proved by showing two claims. Claim 1: if a non-adaptive adversary Ana is successful
in breaking a scheme, an adaptive adversary Aa will also succeed with at least the
same probability. This is true because if there exists Ana that can rewind the system
to a previous state, and claim a normal crash, Aa can use it as a subroutine to
break the scheme. This implies that all existing schemes [3,13,8,11] are vulnerable to
adaptive crash. Claim 2: SLiC that is secure against a non-adaptive adversary cannot
protect against rewinding. SLiC encrypts and permutes the log events randomly.
However because the adversary can see the content of LStore after each operation,
this permutation will be reversible. Aa can rewind the log file to any past state that
it has already seen (which has a different but valid permutation), remove the keys
from KStore (causing the system to be stateless) and claim a normal crash. These
two arguments are formalized in Appendix B.
4 An adaptive crash recovery scheme
The above impossibility result shows that if no key information can be trusted after
the crash, it will not be possible to distinguish between an accidental crash and a
crash attack. One may use an external reliable storage such as blockchain [2,14]. In
such an approach the blockchain will store data that will allow the recovery algorithm
to detect a crash state. Such a solution will have challenges including the need for a
high rate of access to blockchain. Our goal is to design a solution without using an
external point of trust.
4.1 The proposed scheme
We build the basis of our protocol close to the PRF-chain FI-MAC protocol of Bellare
and Yee [3]. We assume that each log event is appended to the end of the log with
an authentication tag, a HMAC. We use PRF to evolve the keys needed for HMAC.
Multiple keys can be used in our scheme to prevent rewinding, but for simplicity, we
describe the mechanism with a pair of keys; the keys are used as below:
Double evolving key mechanism. To prevent rewinding, we generate two key
sequences that are evolved with different rates. One of the keys evolves per log entry
to prevent re-ordering and log modification, and guarantees forward security. We call
this key as sequential key. The second key, which is called state-controlled key, is
updated slower relative to the first key at random points of time. This key is used to
reduce the probability that key is removed from the disk after a normal crash.
For each log entry, we use a choice function CF () which receives the index of the
new log entry and the current state-controlled key CF (k′j−1, i) and outputs 0 or 1. If
the output is 0 we use the sequential evolving key and if it is 1 we use state-controlled
key to compute the HMAC.
We require that state-controlled key evolves randomly, so attacker cannot guess
or estimate the positions that KStore is updated. For this, we use a choice function
CF () which gets a random input and outputs 0 or 1. Thus, CF () has the following
properties:(i) by observing the input/output of CF (), adversary cannot predict the
previous outputs; (ii) CF () outputs 1 with probability 1m . With this setting, we can
say the state-controlled key is “ stable” relative to the sequential evolving key.
Definition 3. A key mechanism is called “ stable” if the probability that the key
is removed by a normal crash is .
We use H(k′j−1, i) < T as our choice function CF (), where H is a cryptographic
hash function like SHA-256, k′j−1 is the current state-controlled key, idx is the index
of the log entry that is going to be stored in LStore, and T is a target value. T is
chosen such that the above equation holds with rate 1m on average, that is the state-
controlled key is evolved with probability 1m at each log entry. We show in Section
6, how to determine T for a given m and prove the security of our scheme using this
choice function in Theorem 1. A similar choice function has been used in Bitcoin [12].
Note that even by choosing a random choice function, adversary can find the
index of the event corresponding to the last usage of state-controlled key. This can
be done by exhaustive search in the tail end of the log file, using the HMAC on every
event with the state-controlled key seen in the KStore. To also prevent this attack we
require that the HMAC of the events where state-controlled key is updated should
have a source of randomness. We use the state-controlled key before updating as
this randomness and concatenate it with the event mi, i.e. hi = HMACk′j (mi, k
′
j−1).
Remember that KStore contains this key during the evolving process and removes
it later on, so attacker cannot find it after compromise. It also worth to mention
that adversary can only succeed in rewinding L to an old state if it forges the state-
controlled key associated with that state. By using PRF to generate the key sequences
this probability is negligible.
Details. Log file consists of a list of events S = {s1, s2, . . . }, where each element si
corresponds to one event. Each new event, mi, is concatenated with a HMAC, hi,
and appended to S = S||si, and si = (mi, hi), where , denotes the concatenation and
|| represents appending. The system algorithms are described in Algorithms 2, 3, 4.
Algorithm 2 Gen(1λ)
Input: Security parameter λ
Output: Initial state Σ0
1: k0, k′0 ← {0, 1}λ
2: χ, χ′ ← {0, 1}λ
3: Let S ← init message //S is a dynamic array
4: Output Σ0 = (ΣK0 , Σ
L
0 , Cache0)
// where ΣK0 = (k0, k
′
0), Σ
L
0 = (S), and
Cache0 = ∅;
Algorithm 3 Log(Σi−1,mi)
Input: old state Σi−1, log event mi
Output: updated state Σi
Σi−1 = [ΣKi−1, Σ
L
i−1, Cachei−1],
ΣKi−1 = (ki−1, k
′
j−1) and Σ
L
i−1 = (S), |S| = i−1;
//new log event mi arrives
1: ki = PRFki−1 (χ)
//Compute the choice function
2: if CF (k′j−1, i) = 1 then
3: k′j = PRFk′
j−1
(χ′)
4: hi = HMACk′
j
(mi, k
′
j−1)
5: else
6: hi = HMACki (mi)
7: si = (mi, hi)
8: S = S||si
9: Output Σi = [ΣKi , Σ
L
i , Cachei]
//where ΣKi = (ki, k
′
i) and Σ
L
i = (S)
Algorithm 4 Recover(Σ,Σ0)
Input: State Σ to check, initial state Σ0
Output: Recovered log events
{(ρi,m′i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n′}
//Let si = (mi, hi)
1: R = ∅ (recover set), ExpSet = ∅ (expendable
set)
//compute keys
2: for i = 1 to n′ + cs do
3: ki = PRFki−1 (χ)
4: KS ∪ (i, ki,⊥)
5: if CF (k′j−1, i) = 1 then
6: if i > n′ then
7: K′ ∪ k′j−1
8: k′j = PRFk′
j−1
(χ′)
9: KS ∪ (i, k′j , k′j−1)
10: Remove (i, ki,⊥) from KS
11: K′ ∪ k′j
//verify HMACs using the key set KS which
is of form (i, ki, κi)
where κi is ⊥ or k′j−1
12: for i = 1 to n′ do
13: if HMACki (mi, κi) = hi, ki, κi ∈ KS
then
14: Update R∪ (i,mi)
//compute expendable logs
15: for i = n′ − cs+ 1 to n′ + cs do
16: ExpSet ∪ i
//Plausibility check
17: if X /∈ K′ then
18: Outputs ⊥
19: else if |R| < 1 ∨ ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n′} : {(i, .) /∈
R ∧ i /∈ ExpSet} then
20: Outputs ⊥
21: else
22: Outputs R
Gen(1λ): We use a PRF to generate and evolve the required keys. Let PRF :
K × Y → Z be a function where K is the key space, Y is the domain and Z is
the range, all are determined by security parameter λ. PRF (k, ·) is often denoted by
PRFk(·). There are two initial keys, one for computing sequential keys, denote it with
k0, and one for computing state-controlled keys, denote it with k
′
0. All the secrets
are shared with the verifier at the beginning of the log file and they are removed
from system after updating it to the next key. Note that PRF also takes a second
input which does not need to be secret and it is stored at the logging device and
also shared with the verifier (We represent these inputs with χ and χ′). PRF evolves
as follows: ki = PRFki−1(χ) (similarly k
′
i = PRFk′i−1(χ
′)). State-controlled key is
initially k′0. S is initialized with a specific message, which represent the information
of log initialization such as the date, size, device id and etc; this is to prevent total
deletion attack. We use Log(., .) algorithm that is described next to log the initial
event, init message. We assume that cache is initially empty, and the state of the L
is Σ0 = (Σ
K
0 , Σ
L
0 , Cache0), where the state of the KStore is Σ
K
0 = (k0, k
′
0) and the
state of the LStore is ΣL0 = (S).
Fig. 2: The logging operation using double evolving keys; log entry s55 uses k′3 and then k
′
3
evolves to k′4 which is used for s80.
Fig. 3: Estimating the set of possible keys. Blue cells are the locations that state-controlled
key has been updated and the red rectangular shows the Expset.
Log(Σi−1,mi): Each log entry is of the form si = (mi, hi) and it is appended to
the dynamic array S = S ∪ (si), where hi is the HMAC of mi using either ki or
X = k′j . For each log entry at index i, CF (k
′
j−1, i) is calculated; if the output is
1 then k′j−1 is updated to k
′
j and HMAC of mi is computed using k
′
j and k
′
j−1,
hi = HMACk′j (mi, k
′
j−1), otherwise ki is used for computing the HMAC, hi =
HMACki(mi). Figure 2 shows how Log algorithm works. When CF () outputs 1,
the corresponding log entry uses the state-controlled key.
Recover(Σ,Σ0): Verifier V receives the state Σ consisting of n′ log events (possibly
crashed) in LStore. V knows the size of each log entry and can parse the LStore to
n′ log entries. V also knows the initial state of the L, so re-computes all the random
coins and the keys and stores the keys in the set KS. V can verify the HMAC of
each log entry using either the sequential key or the state-controlled key depending
on the output of choice function CF (). The indexes between n′ − cs + 1 to n′ + cs
are considered as expendable set. V also finds the set of possible state-controlled keys
that may be in the KStore at the time of the crash. After the crash one such key will
be in KStore (lines 6-11). If the size of the log file is n′, last key that has been updated
before n′ will be in the KStore (because logging is immediately after key update).
Since it is possible to have a situation where the the cache contains a new event and
KStore contains the updated state-controlled key, but the corresponding event has
not been written to the log file, we will have the following. For a log file of length n′
the key set K ′ consists of (i) state-controlled keys that are generated between index
n′ and n′+ cs (future keys), and (ii) the last state-controlled key generated the event
n′. Figure 3 shows how to find this key set. In this example, cs = 4 and the size of
log file n′ = 11, key k′3 is associated with the last stored event, and k
′
4 is associated
with an unwritten event. So, K ′ = {k′3, k′4}.
Plausibility check. If the state-controlled key, X, is not in the key set K ′ then we
output ⊥ meaning untrusted log. If the number of recovered events are less than 1
there is a total deletion attack. If there is an index which is neither in the expendable
set nor in the recovered set, then there is a deletion/modification attack. Otherwise,
Recover(., .) outputs index-message pairs.
5 Security and efficiency
First we give two lemmas; Lemma 1 shows the stability of our mechanism and Lemma
2 shows the relation between 1m , and the number of log entries that adversary can
truncate from the end of log, `. Then, we give Theorem 1, for which we follow
the ExpAdapCrAa,Π () game and assume that after compromise, attacker has access to
everything in the system including the choice function, the keys in the KStore and
the key cache. (Please see the details of proofs in Appendix C.)
Lemma 1. The double evolving key mechanism is α
2
m stable if the choice function
CF () outputs 1 with probability 1m .
Let α denotes the probability that a key is deleted from KStore (because of re-
ordering procedure in the system). If state-controlled key evolves with probability
1
m at each event, the probability that both sequential and state-controlled keys, are
removed during a normal crash will be α × αm . Note that by choosing large values
for m this probability becomes negligible. If we use two independent state-controlled
keys using different PRFs, and evolving at different rates ( 1m1 and
1
m2
, respectively),
then the probability that after a normal crash, the sequential key and both state-
controlled keys are missing will be reduced to α× αm1 × αm2 . This method can be used
to dramatically decrease the chance of key removal key in a normal crash if we do
not want to increase the value of m directly.
Note that we cannot unlimitedly increase m. If m is chosen to be so large, attacker
may want to keep the state-controlled key untouched and truncate the log file for a
number of events, cs+ `, such that the key is also valid in the truncated state (note
that we are interested in the value of `, since we do not have any guarantee for cs
events in a normal crash anyway). Consider that attacker compromises the logging
device at state n where the set of possible keys is K ′n and then cuts off cs + ` log
events from the end which results in the malicious state n′; the set of possible state-
controlled keys is denoted by K ′n′ at state n
′. If K ′n and K
′
n′ have intersection and the
key in the KStore is one of the keys in the intersection of the two key sets then verifier
cannot distinguish the crash attack from the accidental crash and hence crash attack
ends up successfully. The value of ` is important to the security of our system and
our goal is to reduce `. In the following lemma 2, we find the success probability of
attacker in the attack mentioned above; attacker knows the key evolving probability
1
m and the size of the log file.
Lemma 2. Assuming that the evolving probability of state-controlled key is 1m , and
attacker compromises the device at sate Σn, truncates cs+ ` events from the log file,
results in malicious state Σn′ , and keeps the key in KStore untouched. The success
probability of such attacker is bounded to Ps = (1− 1m )` × 1b csm c+1 .
Theorem 1. Our construction provides [PRF (λ), PRF (λ), f(n, n
′, `, cs, λ)]-Crash
Integrity against an adaptive attacker A, where PRF-HMAC is PRF (λ) secure, `
is the number of events adversary wants to delete, cs is the cache size, n is the size
of log file at state Σn, n
′ is the number of log entries returned by adversary in the
malicious state Σn′ , λ is the security parameter, and f() is as follows:
f =
{
0, if n′ < 1
max{PRF (λ), (1− 1m )` × 1b cs
m
c+1}, otherwise
(1)
The theorem shows that m can be chosen to make the success probability of trun-
cating the log becomes negligible. This choice however will result in small value of
m (bigger than 1). Achieving  stability requires large values of m, while crash in-
tegrity suggests small m. By using multiple evolving keys we can keep m small while
achieving  stability guarantee of the mechanism. This is because each key has a
small evolving probability, so the probability that all keys are removed at the same
time will be negligible. If attacker truncates the file by more than cs events, there
is at least one key that will be affected and this will reveal the attack. The num-
ber of keys, nsc, will depend on the probabilities { 1m1 , 1m2 , ..., 1mnsc }. One can also
choose a different distribution for the choice function. By using uniform distribution
for double evolving key mechanism, adversary can truncate the file by at most m log
entries, with success probability m−`m+cs for ` < m. Appendix D gives details of this
analysis. Finding the best probability distribution for CF () to minimizes the success
probability of the attacker is an interesting future research direction.
5.1 Complexity analysis
According to Log(·, ·) defined in algorithm 3, the complexity of adding one event is
O(1) since it needs (i) evolving the keys and (ii) computing the HMAC, and hence
there are constant number of disk operations. Although in SLiC [6] the computational
complexity of logging is O(1), our proposed system is faster: the required computa-
tion in SLiC consists of (i) updating the keys,(ii) encrypting the log event, and (iii)
performing a local permutation on the log file. Additionally, each log operation in
our scheme requires one write operation on disk whereas in SLiC each log operation
requires two write operations. Moreover, in our system the order of events is pre-
served in the log file, so that searching a specific event is efficient. The complexity of
Recover(·, ·) in our scheme (algorithm 4) for verifying the total number of n′ events
is equal to O(n′); the first and the second loop in algorithm 4 takes O(n′) compu-
tations, the third loop has complexity of O(1) and the plausibility check has O(n′).
In SLiC [6], the complexity of recover algorithm is O(n′log(n′)) since it needs to run
sort algorithm for verification. The complexity of our scheme is less than SLiC, but
it is the same as SLiCOpt [6] (please see Table 1).
Table 1: Comparison between computation complexity of our scheme and SLiC
Algorithm Our scheme SLiC [6] SLiCOpt [6]
Log(·, ·) O(1) O(1) O(1)
Recover(·, ·) O(n′) O(n′log(n′)) O(n′)
6 Implementation and evaluation
We implement and evaluate the double evolving key mechanism in Python. The
experiments are run on two hardware platforms: a windows computer with 3.6 GHz
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700 CPU; a Raspberry Pi 3, Model B with 600 MHz ARM
CPU running Raspbian.
Logging Performance: We measure the logging performance on a prepared text
file as the source of system events. The text file contains 220 random strings, each
with 160 characters. To implement our log scheme, we use ChaCha20[4] for PRFs and
SHA-256 as hash function in HMACs. We find the cache size of our machine using
the same approach explained in [6]; the maximum UDP packet sending rate is 500
event/s (please see Appendix E for the result of our experiment). Accordingly, the
cache size, cs is 15000 ≈ 214 events considering the page eviction time of 30s. We set
m = cs and T value in the CF () is determined to be 2242 = 2256/214 which outputs
1 with probability 1/214 [5] (please see Appendix E for the related experiments).
The length of both keys is 256 bits. We implement two logging schemes to compare
with our logging scheme: (i) Plain scheme: Each system events is stored in the log
file as plaintext. (ii) SLiC: The logging algorithm proposed in [6]. We initialize with
λ = 215 randomly ordered dummy events as the same in [6]. We implement PRFs
using ChaCha20 [4], HMACs using SHA-256 and encryption functions using AES-
CTR-256. The size of the key in is 256 bits.
By comparing our scheme with the plain scheme we can find the extra cost to
provide crash integrity. We also compare our scheme with SLiC to find the extra
cost of protecting against an adaptive adversary. Table 2 shows the total runtime to
log 220 system events using three aforementioned logging schemes on Windows PC
and Raspberry Pi. We repeat the experiments for 5 times, each time with a new file
containing 220 events (the other settings remain same). For the same hardware and
Table 2: The total time (in seconds) to log 220 events
Hardware Scheme Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4 Exp5
Windows PC
Our Scheme 40.2 40.2 40.4 40.7 40.5
SLiC 95.2 96.0 95.2 95.4 96.0
Plain 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Raspberry Pi
Our Scheme 330.5 325.4 319.0 324.5 319.6
SLiC 790.2 792.0 777.9 789.2 796.8
Plain 18.8 18.7 18.8 19.0 18.9
the same logging schemes, but with different files, the runtime remains same. This
is aligned with our expectation: logging performance is independent of file content.
On the windows PC, our scheme takes ≈ 40 s (≈ 26K events/s) on average. This
represents a multiplicative overhead of 20, compared to the plain scheme, while SLiC
takes ≈ 95s, with an overhead of 47. Compared to our log scheme, SLiC has a
multiplicative overhead of 2, while our scheme provides extra security protection.
However, in [6], they observed a slowdown factor of 20 for logging rate on a laptop.
The PRF they chose or the difference between their hardware and ours may cause the
discrepancy of the result. Unfortunately, We could not find any detailed information
regarding the implementation of PRF in [6].
The runtime on the Pi is roughly 8 times the runtime on the desktop, because of
the computational limit of Raspberry Pi. The results shows that our logging scheme
is still lightweight for the resource-constrained device. It takes ≈ 324 s (≈ 3.2K
events/s) on average to log 220 events. The overhead of our scheme compared to
plain scheme is 17. SLiC has a multiplicative overhead of 2 compared to our scheme,
and an overhead of 42 compared to plain scheme.
Recovery Performance: Normally, we assume the logging results are written to a
file in the OS. If crash happens, the verifier can always get the number of events (n
′
)
based on the size of the file. In our implementation, the value of n
′
is 220. We run our
Recover(., .) algorithm on the five log files generated earlier before. Table 3 shows
the total runtime to recover log files on two platforms. It takes ≈ 37.4s on average
to recover all the system events on the desktop and ≈ 308.4s on the Pi. We observe
that it takes slightly more time for logging than recovery, maybe because of the poor
Table 3: The total runtime (in seconds) to recover a log file of size 220 events
Hardware Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 Exp 5
Windows PC 37.1 37.6 37.5 37.3 37.3
Raspberry Pi 311.0 303.1 302.0 303.4 303.3
I/O handling of Python. In our implementation of log algorithm, the key is evolved
per new line from the I/O. While in the implementation of recovery algorithm, all of
the keys are reconstructed before any reading from the I/O.
7 Conclusion
We proposed adaptive crash attack where adversary can see intermediate states of
the logging operation. By compromising the logging device, adversary can rewind the
system back to one of the past states and then crash it to appear as a normal crash.
We showed that this attack is strictly stronger than non-adaptive crash attack and all
existing schemes are subjective to this attack. We also proposed double evolving key
mechanism as a protection against rewinding which basically relies on two sequences
of keys evolving with different rates. The security of scheme is proved and the perfor-
mance of our approach is evaluated on both a desktop and Raspberry Pi. Ensuring
crash integrity against an adaptive attacker without considering a protected memory
for keys is left as future work.
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A Detail of SLiC protocol [6]
There are three algorithms, Ge(·), Log(·, ·), and Recover(·, ·), as follows:
Gen(1λ): An initial key K0 and seed seed0 are chosen uniformly from random.
Log entries are stored in a dynamic array S. S is initialized by storing λ dummy
events in the random order. To add these dummy elements dummy1; ...; dummyλ to
S, Log mechanism is used. The output of Gen is the initial state Σ0 comprising the
key K0, seed seed0, and array S. State Σ0 is shared between L and V .
Log(Σi−1,mi): For log event mi, the log entry si is computed as si = (ci;hi;κi)
and appended to S; where si is a dynamic array, ci is the encryption of event mi
using key Ki (ci = EncKi(mi)) and hi is the HMAC of mi using the same key
(hi = HMACKi(ci)). The key Ki is updated through a PRF Ki+1 = PRFKi(χ) for
some constant χ. The sorting key κi is computed using a PRF (κi = PRFKi−1(i))
where i is the index of the event. Then by using a PRG, PRG(seedi), a position
pos is selected between 1 and λ + i. seedi is updated to seedi+1 through a PRF,
seedi+1 = PRFseedi(χ
′). Position pos is the position where the new log entry si =
(ci;hi;κi) is stored. If pos 6= λ + i, the log entries are swapped; S[pos] is appended
to S and si is written at S[pos]. Finally, Ki−1 is evolved to Ki and seedi−1 to seedi.
Recover(Σ,Σ0): On receiving state Σ as input, which comprises of log entries
pi′ = (s′1, ..., s
′
n′), the log file is parsed to n
′ log entries (which may be broken). K0 and
seed0 are moved forward to the earliest possible time of a valid state. Expendable log
events ε are considered from indexes n′−cs till n′+cs. To compute ε, the permutation
pi is reconstructed to determine where log entries should be located in a valid S. Here,
pi[i] = j denotes that log entry si resides at S[j]. Then, V replays L’s random coins
and the swaps. The log entries s′i are sorted by their keys κi and stored in a binary
search tree. V then checks the HMAc of all n′ + cs log entries. The events that their
HMAC is valid will be added to set R. Finally, V perform a plausibility check to
distinguish a regular crash from a crash attack. If the size of recovered set R is less
than λ − cs, then there is a complete deletion. If log event mi, 1 ≤ n′ − cs is not
recovered, it must be in the set of expendable events ε. If not, there is a deletion
attack. Otherwise, V outputs the recovered set R.
B Impossibility result
Lemma A. If there exists a non-adaptive adversary Ana who plays the
ExpCrIntAna,Π,Crash() game [6] and successfully deletes or modifies at least one event
with probability  from L, then there exists an adaptive adversary Aa who interacts
with Ana and wins the ExpAdapCrAa,Π () game with probability at least .
Proof. To prove the lemma, we assume that Aa responds to Gen, Log, and Crash
queries made byAna with the help of GENQ(), LOGΣ,Q() and CRASHΣ() oracles in
the ExpAdapCrAa,Π () game and the challenger C. The goal ofAa is to win the Exp
AdapCr
Aa,Π ()
game using the information outputted by Ana.
First, challenger C runs Gen(1λ) and initializes LStore, KStore and cache (line 2
of ExpCrIntAna,Π,Crash() and Exp
AdapCr
Aa,Π () ). Then, Ana sends n messages mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
to Aa to log (lines 3 to 5 of ExpCrIntAna,Π,Crash()). On receiving the message mi, Aa
adaptively calls the LOGΣ,Q() oracle, and receives the state of the LStore Σ
L
i and its
cache cacheLi . Note that Ana can also call Gen and Crash oracles which are required
to be handled by Aa. In case of Gen queries, Aa calls GENQ() oracle which initializes
a new log on L and for Crash queries, A calls CRASHΣ(). Ana removes or modifies
some events, and returns the crashed state Σcr and the positions that it has modified
or deleted α1, · · · , α` (ExpCrIntA,Π,Crash() line 6)).Aa outputs whateverAna outputs and
wins the game with the probability at least3 equal to .
Lemma B. if there is a scheme ζ which provides crash integrity (according to
ExpCrIntAna,Π,Crash() game), it can be broken by an adaptive adversary Aa who plays
ExpAdapCrAa,Π () game.
Proof. We prove the lemma using SLIC [6] as ζ. We follow the ExpAdapCrAa,Π () game on
SLIC [6]. First, challenger C calls Gen(1λ) algorithm in [6] which initializes, (i) the
LStore using Log(·, ·), (ii) the KStore to hold the required keys, and (iii) the cache
to be empty. It returns the LStore ΣL0 and its associated cache cache
L
0 = ∅ to Aa.
Aa calls LOGΣ,Q() to log n messages mi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Each message is logged
using Log(·, ·) algorithm in [6] and the LStore ΣLi and cacheLi are returned to Aa.
Finally, Aa compromises L, rewinds its state to be as Σ′n′ = [ΣLn′ , ∅, (cacheLn′ , ∅)],
where 1 ≤ n′ < n − cs and calls CRASHΣ(). Then A returns the crashed state
Σ
′cr
n′ and all the positions αi it has removed where αi ∈ {n′ + 1, · · · , n} (note that
n′+cs+1, .., n are not in the expendable set of Σ
′cr
n′ ). Challenger C runs Recover(·, ·)
of [6] to get R¸. Since Σ′n′ is a valid state R is not ⊥, but the αis are missing from
it. Therefore, adversary wins the game and successfully deletes the events from L
without being detected.
C Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove the lemma, we should compute P (deletion∧key updates).
Note that key can be removed from KStore if key is being updated at the moment
that crash happens. (Recall that in the update procedure of key, (i) the current key
ki−1 goes to cache and updated to a new key ki, (ii) ki is written to KStore and (iii)
ki−1 is deleted. Assuming that the logging system allows reordering of this process,
deletion of ki−1 can happen before ki is written on KStore. A crash at this moment
leads to a state where the keys are missing from both KStore and cache). Let α
denotes the probability that a key is deleted from KStore (because of re-ordering
procedure in the system). If state-controlled key evolves with probability 1m at each
event, the probability that key is removed during a normal crash will be α× 1m .
Proof of Lemma 2. Assume that the set K ′n represents the possible state-
controlled keys after crash in state Σn, which consists of the last generated key
before index n and all keys from n to n + cs. The size of K ′n is on average equal to
b csmc + 1 based on the frequency of key evolving. When adversary compromises the
device, one of the keys in K ′n resides in KStore; each key has probability
1
|K′n| to be
in KStore. Assume that adversary wants to keep that key, and truncate cs+ ` entries
3 The adaptive adversary Aa has also seen intermediate states whereas Ana succeeds with-
out observing those states. In the worst case, the extra knowledge that Aa has, does not
help it and the success probability is .
from the log. If the key which is in the KStore is also in the possible key set at state
n′, K ′n′ , attacker succeeds. To find the success probability of attacker we need to first
consider all the cases that K ′n intersects with K
′
n′ , and calculate their probability.
(Remember that the new log file has length of n′ = n − cs − `, and the ExpSet for
the malicious state Σn′ is between n− 2cs− `+ 1 to n− `.)
There are two possible cases, in each of them there is a possibility that at least one
state-controlled key is in both possible key sets of K ′n and K
′
n′ .
– Case 1: The last key evolved before n is also the last key evolved before n′, so
both key sets have the same last key.
– Case 2: The last key evolved before n is not the same as the last key evolved
before n′, but it evolves between n′ + 1 to n′ + cs, so it is also in K ′n′ .
Case 1 implies that there is no evolving between n′ to n. The length of this interval
is cs+ `. This probability equals to (binomial distribution) P1 = (1− 1m )cs+`.
Case 2 implies that we have at least 1 key evolving between n′ + 1 and n′ + cs
(the length of interval is cs) and there is no key evolving between n′ + cs + 1 till n
(the length of interval is `); This leads to the following probability:
P2 = [1− (1− 1m )cs](1− 1m )` = (1− 1m )` − (1− 1m )cs+`
Attacker succeeds if either case 1 or case 2 happens and the key in the KStore is
the one which is in the intersection of the two key sets. So, the success probability of
attacker is bounded to: Ps = (P1 + P2)× 1|K′n|
By substituting P1 and P2 and by considering |K ′n| = csm + 1, we get:
Ps = (1− 1m )` × 1b csm c+1
Proof of Theorem 1. Let assume that PRF (λ) = max{PRF1(λ), PRF2(λ)},
where PRF1(λ) is the success probability of attacker in breaking PRF-HMAC [3] for
the sequential key and PRF2(λ) is the success probability of attacker in breaking
PRF-HMAC for the state-controlled key.
The success probability of attacker in modification is equal to success probability of
breaking PRF-HMAC (either the sequential key or the state-controlled key), so it is
PRF (λ).
For deletion and rewinding attacks, if adversary deletes 1 log event from the log file
at position pos < n − cs it should forge the PRF-HMAC for all log entries greater
equal to pos. so, the integrity of log file is reduced to the security of PRF-HMAC
(either the sequential key or the state-controlled key).
If adversary does a total deletion attack, n′ < 1, the attack is detected and hence the
success probability is 0. If attacker rewinds (or truncates) the system back to n′ =
n−(cs+`), in which cs+` events has been truncated and keeps the key in the KStore
without change, the success probability of attacker will be max{PRF1(λ), Ps}, based
on the Lemma 2. If m is chosen such that for ` > `0 the attack mentioned in Lemma
2 becomes negligible, then attacker should modify the key in the KStore for ` > `0;
success probability of such attacker is bounded by the security of HMAC-PRF, which
is PRF2(λ).
D Uniform choice function
Lemma 3. Assuming that the evolving rate of state-controlled key is 1m over each
interval size of m where m < cs, and attacker compromises the device at sate Σn,
truncates cs + ` events from the log file, results in malicious state Σn′ , and keeps
the key in KStore untouched. The success probability of such attacker is bounded to
Ps =
m−`
m+cs for ` < m.
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 2 and we do not repeat the common parts for
brevity. We need to only re-compute the probability of two possible cases stated in
Lemma 2 that lead to an intersection between key sets:
Case 1 implies that there is no evolving between n′ to n. The length of this interval
is cs+ ` and cs+ ` > cs > m; based on the evolving rate we know that there is one
key evolving in this interval, so p1 = 0 and case 1 is not probable.
Case 2 implies that we have 1 key evolving between n′+ 1 and n′+ cs (the length
of interval is cs) and there is no key evolving between n′+ cs+ 1 till n (the length of
interval is `); as cs > m the first statement is always true and there is 1 key evolving
between n′ + 1 and n′ + cs. The second statement, is not probable if ` > m, since
we have 1 key evolving, but if ` < m then with probability P2 = 1 − `m we have no
evolving. Therefore, attacker succeeds if case 2 happens and the key in the KStore
is the one which is in the intersection of the two key sets. So, the success probability
of attacker is bounded to: Ps = P2 × 1|K′n| , ` < m.
By considering |K ′n| = csm + 1, we get: P = (1− `m )× 1csm+1 =
m−`
m+cs , ` < m.
Theorem 2. Our construction, using a uniformly distributed choice function over
m, provides [PRF (λ), PRF (λ), f(n, n
′, `, cs, λ)]-Crash Integrity against an adaptive
attacker A, where PRF-HMAC is PRF (λ) secure, ` is the number of events adversary
wants to delete, cs is the cache size, n is the size of log file at state Σn, n
′ is the
number of log entries output by adversary in the malicious state Σn′ , λ is the security
parameter, and f() is as follows:
f =

0, if n′ < 1
m−`
m+cs
, else if n′ ≥ n− (cs+ `)
PRF (λ), else if n
′ < n− (cs+ `)
(2)
E Extra experiments
Estimation of Cache size We used the same method described in [6] to estimate
the Cache size of our Windows computer. We used a remote computer as the syslog
server to send the system events to our windows computer with different rates. Both
computers are in the same LAN and the communication protocol is UDP. To calculate
the packet drop rate, we divided the length of received data on our computer by the
length of the sent data from the syslog server. The results are shown in Figure 4. The
drop rate starts to grow when the sending rate increases to 500 events/s.
State-controlled key update To validate whether the update frequency of the
state-controlled key in practical is close to the theoretical value of 1/214, we record
the distance (number of system events) between every two state-controlled keys and
collected the data out of five experiments on Windows PC. The data is plotted to a
histogram in Figure 5. The mean value of the distance is close to the desired value,
which is 214. However, 56% of the distances is less than 15000 events. This means
56% of the state control key is updated within 15000 events. The longest distance is
80000 events. All keys are updated below this maximum value.
Fig. 4: Packet drop rate Fig. 5: Distribution of distance between ev-
ery two state-controlled keys
